Muni Exchange Traded Funds vs. Mutual Funds

ETF’s

Exchange Traded Funds have become increasingly popular in recent years. These funds are for the most part passively managed, track indices, and have low expense ratios compared to the average mutual fund. ETFs can be traded intraday, shorted, and bought with margin. Mutual Funds do not offer the same features. There are no size minimums to invest in ETFs. This makes them popular with smaller investors. Exchange Traded Funds are usually a more tax-efficient vehicle than mutual funds because they don’t realize gains or losses when selling securities. ETF’s can be concentrated to give an investor exposure to a specific segment or market, such as precious metals, single countries, foreign currencies, and U.S. Treasury Bonds. It should be no surprise that the ETF has finally discovered the Muni market.

The Muni Bond Market

The Municipal Bond market is a highly fragmented market of over 50,000 different issues. Last year, there was total issuance of $388 billion from 12,706 different deals for an average size of $31 million per deal. The market is a collection of regional markets. Each state has different tax rates and different infrastructure needs. The Individual Investor (as a whole) is the largest investor class of muni bonds accessed via individual securities, separately managed accounts, mutual funds, and closed-end funds. These investors typically purchase munis because of the tax advantages of owning tax-free bonds.

Historical Problems Creating Muni Indices

The fragmentation of this market has caused problems in the past with the creation of a viable index for munis. Due to the wide bid/ask spreads and tax consequences of trading, individuals tend to buy and hold muni bonds to maturity. This strategy means that after a bond deal is issued, the amount of trading in that security diminishes rapidly over a short period of time. This makes price determination difficult for any individual security, because actual trades do not take place. It is this lack of actual price determination through trades that has caused problems with Muni indices in the past. This was evident with the Muni bond contract. The CBOT finally stopped trading this contract in 2006, because of problems with the index that led muni dealers to look for alternative hedge vehicles to hedge their inventory.

There are currently several indices money managers use to measure performance which work well for their purposes. These indices are priced daily and are meant to reflect changes that have taken place in the market. The CBOT muni index was a live index that needed to be priced continually. The current plan is to price the relevant ETF index on a daily basis. Most ETF’s in other markets trade continuously and can be compared to a transparently priced index which also trades continuously, such as the S&P Index. Without transparent continuous pricing, muni ETF’s may be subject to some of the same issues that brought down the CBOT muni contract: manipulation by hedge funds and lack of pricing relevancy.

Portfolio Construction And Performance

The ETF faces constraints which will affect its ability to offer good value to its shareholders. The ETF must only purchase bonds from large deals. The table shows the different size limitations of the deals they may purchase. This will limit their ability to invest in any cheap smaller regional issues that may come to market. The purpose of this restriction is to make sure they are investing in liquid names. There are also limitations as to the issue’s purpose. For example, some ETF’s can’t invest in tobacco bonds, hospitals, or housing bonds. Neither one can invest in AMT bonds.

ETF Advantage May Not Apply to Muni Investor

Marginal tax rates determine the attractiveness of muni bonds for any given investor. High Net Worth Individuals with significant levels of taxable income find munis especially attractive. These investors normally have large sums of money to invest and don’t benefit from the ability to invest small sums of money in an ETF. There may be adverse tax consequences of selling holdings in these funds, so it is unlikely that the ability to liquidate holdings intra-day would offer much benefit to these investors. When we compare the tax free ETF to Vanguard mutual fund, we see little benefit to purchasing the ETF, and our guess is that the ETF will have difficulty generating higher returns than the mutual fund because of its constraints.

Conclusion

It will be interesting to see how successful the muni ETF is in the future. We expect this success to be somewhat dampened due to difficulties in index construction and the nature of the muni investor.

Click on the table for a larger view

The Case for Intermediate Treasuries

Taxable Fixed Income

For most conservative investors, an intermediate bond strategy represents a sound choice. There are advantages to this strategy compared with either holding cash or long-term bonds. Intermediate US Treasuries have offered significantly higher historical returns than 30 day T-Bills with little additional risk, and have provided annual returns that are only slightly less than long US Treasuries.

A History of Returns

Fixed Income and Equity returns are readily available for the last 81 years through data compiled by Ibbotson. The table below shows a comparison of returns for Intermediate (5 Yr) and Long (20 Yr) U.S. Treasury bonds for the period 1926-2006.

The Long maturity treasuries outperformed shorter bonds by .30% (5.60-5.30%) annually.

Intermediates, thus, captured about 95% of the return of the Long bonds. During this period, Intermediates outperformed the 20 Year bonds in 44 out of 81 periods or about 54% of the time. Long bonds had 21 periods of negative returns, while Intermediates only had 8. Thus, 5 Yr treasuries had positive returns 90% of the time. The duration or market risk of these bonds is compared in the chart below.

An Intermediate treasury has about 37% of the risk of a Long bond. This implies that the risk/reward of owning Intermediate bonds is very attractive when compared to Long bonds. The chart below shows that Intermediates have captured 95% of the return of Long bonds, while taking only 37% of the market risk during the last 81 years.

Conclusion

Portfolios consisting of intermediate maturity taxable securities are suitable for conservative investors’ fixed-income portfolios. These portfolios have generated positive returns about 90% of the time, are much less risky than portfolios of bonds with long maturities, and capture most of the return of a long bond portfolio. While we cannot guarantee that history will repeat itself, there is certainly a compelling case for investing in Intermediate Bond portfolios. This is a non-market-timing strategy that works well when combined with other riskier asset classes. The bonds provide income and dampen the volatility of the overall portfolio.

Why Not Manage A Bond Portfolio For Income?

Role of Bond Portfolio
Most investors own bonds to provide income and to dampen the volatility of the overall portfolio. We manage our bond portfolios for total after-tax return in order to accomplish both of these objectives. Some investors view their fixed-income portfolios solely as a source of income. The income approach to the portfolio often leads the investor to underestimate the additional risks that they take, and is a less desirable approach to managing bond portfolios. Income is only half of the equation. The total return of any bond is the income plus the price change. Income without consideration of the change in asset value is of particular concern when investing in low quality bonds. These bonds have a high correlation to equities. This means that an investor with a large position in these types of bonds has done little to dampen the volatility of the overall portfolio, because when stocks go down, high yield bonds go down as well. This is contradictory to the basic principle of diversification. The investor has added to his equity risk, rather than reduced his risk.

Increased Risks From Income Approach

Credit Risk
Lower rated riskier bonds generally have higher yields. Investors that are chasing yield often end up with these securities. It is similar to a bank robber who gets caught. When asked why he robbed banks his answer was, “because that is where the money is!” Junk bonds are like a magnet for investors who are only looking at the yield the bond might pay. There is no riskier strategy for most individual investors than to take too much credit risk. Why risk 100% of your money to get an additional 1% return? We advise investors to avoid credit risk, and put that money into a higher return asset class, such as equities, where the potential returns are much higher.

Inflation Risk
Some investors may say “when rates are at 5% I am going to put my money into long bonds and forget about them”. This leads to increased market risk and the risk that inflation will erode their future earnings stream. Economic conditions need to be monitored to make sure that inflation doesn’t become a problem again. A better strategy is to have some shorter maturities so that if rates rise maturities can be reinvested in higher yielding securities, and some longer maturities to help protect the income stream in case rates fall.

Reinvestment Risk
In the search for additional yield it is not uncommon for investors to ignore call features on the securities they purchase. This leads to reinvestment risk. A long bond with a short call is very undesirable. If rates rise you are locked into a long maturity at a low yield. If rates fall you have your bonds called away. Either way the investor loses. Who wants to play that game?

Tax Risk
Often muni bond investors will buy bonds that are subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax. These bonds pay a little higher rate than a regular muni, but the consequences of owning the AMT bond are disastrous if the taxpayer’s status changes and he/she finds themselves subject to the AMT. In that case, the interest is then taxed as if it were a taxable bond. We have found that most investors are better off not purchasing AMT bonds.

Components of Total Return That Are Ignored

Yield Curve Shifts
Prices in the bond market change daily. We call these changes in market value due to changes in yield for each maturity, yield curve shifts. When the bond market is volatile, these shifts are a significant part of total return.

Changes in the Composition of the Yield Curve
When money is tight, the yield curve normally flattens. When the Fed eases, the curve normally steepens. These changes are important aspects of the portfolio’s return. Sometimes the best strategy is a barbell strategy. This works well in a flattening curve environment.

Credit Quality Spreads
After tightening during the last 3 years, quality spreads were recently blown out to more traditional levels. Holders of virtually all high yield bonds saw significant declines in the value of their holdings. While these bonds declined in value, high grade bonds rose in value. We experienced a flight to quality rally in the U.S. Treasury market.

Conclusion
Bond performance consists of two parts, income and price change. It is a mistake to manage a portfolio only for income, because income is only half of the story. This approach often leads to higher levels of portfolio risk, and poorer relative performance than a total return approach. This is not the style of most professional bond managers. So, who would take this type of approach? We see this style primarily when an individual is managing his/her own portfolio and is working with a broker who is selling them securities. These individuals are captivated by the higher yields, and don’t know that there is more to managing a bond portfolio than clipping a big coupon.

Bond Insurance:MBIA

Insurance Risk
Last year, over 60% of all Muni Bond issuance was credit enhanced by either insurance or bank LOC’s. Since a guarantee is only as good as the one who guarantees it, the credit-worthiness of an insurer is very important. Last month, Barron’s ran an article about MBIA insurance. In the article, Pershing Square Capital Management justified their short stock position in MBIA by saying the insurer has significant exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market, delinquencies are on the rise for these loans, and MBIA’s insurance exposure is much greater than the rating agencies would like for you to believe. As fixed income money managers, we are less concerned about how well the firm’s stock does. What matters to us is the company’s ability to pay claims as well as the likelihood they would be required to pay these claims.

Breakdown of Insurance In Force

Insurance exposure can be broken down into the following categories:

U.S. and Non-U.S. Public Finance
U.S. and Non-U.S. Structured Finance

The chart below shows the amount and the relationship of this exposure. Default studies would suggest that the exposure to Public Finance is quite manageable. Total Public Finance insurance in force was $706.3 billion at the end of 2006.

The insurance in force for Structured Finance was $254.5 billion for the same period. This includes:

Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO's)
Mortgage-backed Home Equity
Mortgage-backed Other
Mortgage-backed First Mortgage

The next chart shows the breakdown percentages for Structured Finance. According to a recent S&P report, MBIA has $5.78 billion of sub-prime exposure in Mortgage-backed securities, and about $431 million is speculative.

The chart shows 62% of their Net Insurance for Structured Finance is in CDO’s. The same S&P report said MBIA has $16.605 billion of Insurance Exposure to CDO’s with sub-prime exposure, and $2.059 billion of this is for sub-prime mortgages. If we combine this total with the $431 million of speculative Mortgage-backed, the total is $2.49 billion of sub-prime insurance written by MBIA.

Ability to Pay

S&P calculates the ability to pay this insurance exposure by looking at the following:

$13.3 billion in claims paying resources
$6.6 billion in qualified statutory capital
$819 million in earnings last year

S&P argues that any future claims are likely to be less than 1 year’s earnings. Their reasoning is that the firm’s exposure to $431 million of speculative grade sub-prime mortgages is about 6.6% of total statutory capital ($6.6 billion), and less than half of 2006 earnings. We find some problems with this analysis because:

1. None of the $2.059 billion in CDO sub-prime exposure is included in their analysis
2. Default rates for higher quality sub-prime Alt A mortgages are also rising. Currently, 2.9% of these mortgages in CDO’s are 60+ days delinquent and 1.08% are foreclosed.

Conclusion
It is easy to see how MBIA’s earnings may be negatively affected in the future due to increasing default rates in the sub-prime area. However, as bond holders we are more concerned about the firm’s ability to pay and maintain their AAA rating. We still have confidence in MBIA’s ability to pay, but feel deteriorating credit conditions are much worse than S&P’s report would suggest. The rating does not appear to be in danger at this point, but we would rather invest in underlying securities unlikely to ever need the insurance. We feel bond insurance is good when there is a localized event, such as Hurricane Katrina. Investing in junk and relying on insurance to bail you out if something goes wrong is not a formula for success. Insurance is no substitute for research if global credit conditions worsen.

How to Decipher the Cover Sheet of an OS

Introduction

In the previous post, we discussed how to obtain an official statement on a municipal bond issue. Now, we will explore various areas of relative importance on the cover sheet of an OS. The particular Official Statement used in this analysis is the Glendale Arizona Industrial Development Authority Hospital Revenue and Refunding Issue dated in 2007 (The file can be downloaded here). On this document, there are numbers next to the highlighted information that can be used as a guide. Throughout this post, we will explain various parts on the cover page of this Official Statement.

Please note: Not all OS’s are created the same. These sections are not necessarily in the same order as other Official Statements. The goal is to showcase the wide array of information on the cover of an OS.

Details

1. The upper right corner of this Official Statement is the rating(s) on the bond. Some issues may be non-rated (NR). The three largest rating agencies are:

a. Moody’s

b. S&P

c. Fitch

2. There is an opinion from bond counsel on the exemption status for several areas of taxes:

a. Federal

b. State

c. Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)

d. Corporations

3. This section contains:

a. the Size of the Deal

b. the Issuer

c. the Type of Issue (Revenue, General Obligation, Certificate of Participation, etc.)

d. the Particular Series

4. A few key points in this area are:

a. the quantity and increments in which the bonds can be purchased

b. the dates of the year in which interest is paid to the bondholder

5. A subject to redemption prior to maturity is noted in this section. More information about the provision can be found inside the OS.

6. This division consists of descriptions of the obligator, the trustee, and agreement specifications.

7. The Maturity Schedule for the various series of bonds is displayed which includes:

a. Due Date

b. Principal Amount

c. Interest Rate

d. Yield

e. CUSIP

8. This piece includes the specifics of who are not the obligators.

9. Investing in the municipal bonds involves various risks. These risks are disclosed within the Official Statement. The table of contents in the OS allows the reader to efficiently search for a variety of topics such as the risks involved in the municipal bond deal.

10. Appendices are mentioned in this section, which are located towards the conclusion of the OS and can include items such as:

a. General Information

b. Financial Statements

c. Certain Provisions

d. Opinion of Bond Counsel

11. This section notes various counsel involved in the municipal deal such as:

a. Bond Counsel

b. Disclosure Counsel

c. Financial Advisor(s)

12. The manager of the deal and co-managers (if applicable) are located in this segment. If an investor is interested in buying this deal, he/she should give their order to one of the managers.

13. The date the OS was created for distribution is included for recordkeeping purposes.

Conclusion

It is important to navigate through research material in an effective and efficient manner when evaluating potential investment opportunities. The cover page of an Official Statement includes valuable information on the bond issue, but is meant to be a supplement to the entire statement as opposed to a substitution when performing due diligence.

How to Obtain an Official Statement

Introduction

There is a wealth of information available to research municipal bonds. One resource with a plethora of information about a municipal bond issue is the Official Statement (OS). This can be used to become more familiar with the credit of a municipality (issuer). The OS includes such items as the purpose of the deal, the maturity schedule, the status of tax-exemption, sources of payment, debt service requirements, financial statements, and any other pertinent data. The underwriter / senior manager puts together the Official Statement for distribution to dealers, advisors, and investors. The OS is the disclosure notice for a municipal bond issue.

How-To

One might ask, "Where do I find Official Statements?" This brief process will explain the steps needed to retrieve an OS.

1. Go to the website http://www.investinginbonds.com (A picture of the webpage is shown below).

2. Under the Markets in Depth section, there is a subsection titled Municipal Markets. Click on the hyperlink: See Municipal Market At-A-Glance (The section of interest is highlighted in the picture below).

3. Next is a page where you can either select the bonds traded today category, the bonds traded yesterday category, or the bond history category. If you choose bonds traded today or bonds traded yesterday, go to 3A. If you want to enter a CUSIP into bond history, go to 3B.

a. By clicking on bonds traded today or bonds traded yesterday, the page following will show the history of municipal bond trades. In the example below, the State of Arizona was chosen to view bond trade history. You can select a particular bond in the history. On the right side of the page, there is a column labeled More Info. One of the links in this column is Statements (See 4A for further instructions).

b. If you know the CUSIP for the bond you are interested in, you can type it into the bond history box. The following page should show the actual bond and it's description. Click on the hyperlink below the column titled # of Trades.

This will take you to a screen shown below (See 4B for next step).


4. a. By clicking on the Statements link, the site will take you to a page where you can download the Official Statement for this particular issue. The user has an option t0 download the cover page, the entire OS, E-mail the document, or download part of the document. The picture below shows an example of what this page looks like.


b. If you click on the link for Search Munistatements.com, you will come to a page that allows you to download the Official Statement. The user has an option t0 download the cover page, the entire OS, E-mail the document, or download part of the document. The picture below shows an example of what this page looks like.


Conclusion

After the Official Statement is available for viewing, the next step is to research the particular issue. The following post will begin discussion of how to go about performing due diligence on a municipal bond issue beginning with deciphering the cover page of an OS.

What Happened To Bonds?

During the last month, the bond market has weakened dramatically. This is particularly evident in maturities from 10-30 years. The 10 Yr Treasury yield went from 4.63% on May 8 to an intra-day high yield of 5.25% on Friday (6/8) before ending the day at 5.14%. The Treasury market has suddenly become big news, and dominates the talking heads on TV. Investors would do well to ignore the trader talk on TV about bonds, and concentrate on the long-term fundamentals for bonds.


The Fundamentals

The two most important determinants of bond yields are:
1. Inflation expectations
2. Strength/weakness of the economy

The Fed has been concerned about reining in inflation, and raised the Fed Funds rate from a low of 1.0% on 5/4/2004 to the current level of 5.25%. This target was established almost 1 Yr ago on 8/8/2006. Since then, they have been in a holding pattern as inflation has fallen from 2.4% to 2.0% on the core PCE price index. The Fed would like this measure to be within the 1-2% target band. We view the progress on inflation as a positive for bonds. There is no evidence that the recent decline in the bond market is linked to an increase in inflationary expectations. The economy has slowed from about a 2.5% growth rate in August of 2006 to a recent weak 0.6% for the 1st quarter of this year (while the Fed has been on hold). This slowing in the economy is also a positive for the bond markets. So, the economic fundamentals are still positive for bond investors.


The Technicals

Since the long-term fundamentals are still positive for bonds, the most likely explanation for the sharp rise in bond yields last month is to be found in short-term changes or the technicals that pre-occupy the minds of traders. Here are some of the technical developments of the last month:

1. The amount of 10 Yr Treasury securities purchased at the last quarterly refunding on 5/8 by Foreign Central Banks was the highest since November 2005. This appeared to be a positive technical development for the market. These bonds sold at 4.63% at the May auction.
2. Shortly after the auction, the Fed stated it was still concerned about inflation and began to raise doubts that it would ease rates soon. These doubts increased during the month as several hawkish comments were made by different Fed Governors. The chart below from a 6/8 Citigroup report shows the change in expectations for a Fed easing over differing time periods.


As recently as 4/18, the market was pricing in an easing of 75 bp’s this year. This probability has now declined to a 0.0% chance. We believe this change in perception is the primary catalyst for the sell-off this month.
3. There has been Foreign Central Bank tightening by the European Central Bank and the Bank of New Zealand, which has added to the change in psychology of bond traders. Their logic is, "how can the Fed ease when the rest of the world is raising rates?" Were we overly optimistic about the Fed cutting rates 75 bp’s this year?
4. Mortgage durations have been rising in lenders' portfolios as ARMS are replaced with longer fixed rate mortgages by borrowers. This has led to hedging activity by lenders such as FNMA, selling 10 Yr Treasury securities to help shorten the duration of their huge loan portfolios.
5. Traders who look at charts feel that the 20 year bond market rally has ended and are shorting bonds. This has contributed to the weakness in the market.
6. The yield curve has steepened significantly which has been caused by large curve flattening trades being liquidated and replaced by curve steepening trades. This is very plausible because during the time long term yields have risen, short term yields have fallen modestly. Since 3/2/2007, the yield curve has gone from being inverted by (60) bp’s to having a positive slope of 17 bp’s on 6/1/2007. To implement this trade, the trader sells the long bond and buys shorter maturity bonds. This has contributed to the recent rise in rates.


Conclusion

There have been several technical factors that have contributed to the recent rout taking place in the bond market. This has driven yields to attractive levels for investors. This is a good time to ignore the traders on TV. Traders frequently change their opinions and have different time horizons than the investor. These same traders were telling us less than 2 months ago that there was a high probability that we would see a 75 bp's cut in rates this year by the Fed. Now they think there is no chance for a cut in rates. Future actions by the Fed are data dependent. If inflation continues to slow and the economy stays weak, rates will fall. The recent rise in rates should have a dampening effect on the economy which could lead to lower rates in the future. We feel the current sale in the bond market represents an opportunity for investors to add to their fixed income positions.